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ONE MORE BRICK IN THE WALL: THE 
IMPACT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OF EX JURIS DEFENDANTS ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA 
Matthew Johnson 
“When I have been in Canada, I have never heard a Canadian 
refer to an American as a “foreigner.” He is just an “American.” And, 
in the same way, in the United States, Canadians are not “foreigners,” 
they are “Canadians.” That simple little distinction illustrates to me 
better than anything else the relationship between our two countries.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Canada have a lengthy and historical 
development of their common law and statutory standards for 
obtaining personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants in civil litigation.2 
The United States’ doctrine has been developing since the mid-
nineteenth century.3 Canada, however, followed a rigid common law 
                                                 
1   Sarah Lipkis, United States of Canada, WORLD POLICY BLOG (Oct. 22, 
2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/10/22/united-states-
canada(quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
2   See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (stating the proposition 
that in personam jurisdiction cannot be had over an absent defendant, but in rem 
jurisdiction can be had over the absent defendant’s property); see also Moran v. Pyle 
Nat’l (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393 (discussing in personam jurisdiction in tort cases 
over a foreign defendant). 
3   See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727, 731; see also J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding a court may not exercise jurisdiction over 
a defendant that has not purposefully availed itself to doing business within the 
jurisdiction). 
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system until the end of the twentieth century.4 Since 1990, there have 
been five important cases altering the current Canadian doctrine on 
personal jurisdiction of ex juris defendants.5 Most recently, the 2012 
decision of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda marked a notable shift from 
its predecessor, Muscutt v. Courcelles.6 
Today, the United States’ greatest ally and biggest trading 
partner is Canada.7 As China continues to establish itself as a global 
economic power, retaining close ties is important for both nations.8 
Though executives, legislatures, and judiciaries exercise comity9 
between nations,10 the judiciary has the ability to influence and control 
the other branches’ exercise of comity through its decisions and 
interpretations.11 Because of this significant judicial power, this 
                                                 
4   Muscutt v. Courcelles, 2002 CanLII 44957 (ON CA). 
5   Id. ¶ 14-17 (citing Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; Amchem 
Prod. Inc. v. B.C. (Workers’ Comp. Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897; Hunt v. T&N plc., 
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077). 
6   Tanya J. Monestier, (Still) A “Real and Substantial” Mess: The Law of 
Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 396, 402 (2013). 
7   See U.S. Relations with Canada, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Aug. 23, 2013), 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm (noting the U.S. and Canada trade $1.6 
billion worth of goods, daily, and three hundred thousand people cross their shared 
border, daily); see also, Doug Lamborn, U.S. Rep. from Colorado, Building Keystone 
Pipeline will Cement U.S.-Canadian Relations, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/286669-building-keystone-pipeline-will-cement-
us-canada-relations (describing Canada as the United States’ most important trading 
partner, sharing “close ties in culture, language and values”). 
8   See Lipkis, supra note 1 (discussing the potential benefits of the United 
States and Canada forming an E.U.-like relationship to combat the efficiency of 
China’s form of capitalism); When Giants Slow Down, ECONOMIST (July 27, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582257-most-dramatic-and-
disruptive-period-emerging-market-growth-world-has-ever-seen (discussing the 
slowing but steadying growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China). 
9   Comity is defined as “the recognition which one nation allows within 
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
10   See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining legislatures practice “prescriptive comity” by limiting the 
reach of their laws when enacting them). 
11   See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International 
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 14 (2010). 
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comment recognizes the important role courts play in maintaining and 
increasing comity between the United States and Canada. 
This comment will argue that the Van Breda decision has 
moved Canadian courts closer to United States courts on the issue of 
personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, which in turn has created 
increased comity among the two nations. Part II of this comment will 
introduce the history of personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants 
in the United States and Canada. Furthermore, Part II will briefly 
discuss comity and its international role. Part III analyzes the current 
state of jurisdiction in the United States and compares it with the new 
Canadian standard set forth in Van Breda. Through this comparison, 
this comment will explore the opportunity for increased comity 
between the two nations. Part IV proposes that the current positions 
of both nations regarding personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants 
allows for greater comity between the two nations, increasing their 
economic partnership and individual international strength. 
I.         Historical Background of Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris 
Defendants in the United States and Canada and the Role of 
International Comity 
A.         Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in the United 
States 
The United States’ modern day jurisdiction found its roots in 
Pennoyer v. Neff,12 but has undergone substantial change, culminating in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.13 
1.  Pennoyer to International Shoe. — In Pennoyer v. Neff, the 
United States Supreme Court determined due process does not give a 
state the authority to assert in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant who does not personally assent to jurisdiction.14 In 
reaching this determination, the Court focused on two “principles of 
                                                 
12   Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730. 
13   See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 
(2011); see generally Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) (discussing the evolution 
of Supreme Court rulings on personal jurisdiction). 
14   Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730 (citing D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165 (1851)). 
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public law.”15 First, every state has jurisdiction over persons and 
property within its jurisdiction. Second, a state does not have 
jurisdiction over persons or property beyond its jurisdiction.16 
Relying on previous state and federal court decisions, however, 
the Pennoyer Court reiterated that a plaintiff who is unable to subject a 
foreign defendant to in personam jurisdiction may attach a defendant’s 
property within the court’s jurisdiction to hail the defendant into 
court.17 But, if the defendant fails to appear, any judgment may “only 
bind [the defendant] to the extent of such property.”18 The Court 
noted the burdens a state may impose upon foreign persons.19 
In the courtroom, Pennoyer v. Neff has essentially become 
irrelevant.20 As legal scholar Michael Hoffheimer states, “[i]t is late in 
the day to argue . . . Pennoyer.”21 However, the court’s reasoning is still 
relevant to understanding and discussing the connection between due 
process and personal jurisdiction.22 With increasing global complexity, 
the United States Supreme Court found itself needing to shift toward 
a new doctrine, which could better adjudicate the increased mobility of 
citizens between different states.23 
Nearly five decades after Pennoyer v. Neff was handed down, the 
Supreme Court, in an attempt to expand the reach of Pennoyer,24 actually 
began to subtly shift away from its precedent.25 The Court in Hess v. 
                                                 
15   Id. at 722. 
16   Id. (citing Story, J., Confl. Laws, sect. 539) (emphasis added). 
17   Id. at 724-25 (citing Cooper v. Reynolds 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870); 
Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mas. 35 (1828)). 
18   Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724 (citing Picquet, 5 Mas. 35). 
19   Id. at 734-35 (conditions for marriage/divorce, requiring foreign 
persons to appoint an agent to receive service of process when entering into a 
partnership within the state, and conditions for enforcing obligations against 
corporate officers other than personal service). 
20   See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1007 (2012). 
21   Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 554. 
22   Id. at 554-55. 
23   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1003. 
24   Id. 
25   See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (asserting the power 
of a state to exclude a non-resident confers upon the state a power to imply 
appointment of an agent through use of state highways, rendering physical presence 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
526 
Pawloski allowed the state of Massachusetts to serve an out-of-state 
defendant, who was involved in an accident, pursuant to a 
Massachusetts statute.26 The statute stated that in using Massachusetts’ 
highways, a driver appoints the registrar as his agent for service of 
process.27 Thus, once a driver enters Massachusetts, he impliedly 
consents that a state official may act as his agent, thereby making it 
possible for the state to obtain jurisdiction over him in the event he is 
involved in an accident or collision within the State’s borders.28 Despite 
citing numerous authorities,29 all of which appeared to direct the court 
toward a strict Pennoyer ruling, the Court opted to base its decision on 
public policy reasons.30 By using this type of analysis, as well as relevant 
case law,31 the Court determined that whether the appointment of a 
state officer is formal or implied is “not substantial” so far as the 
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned.32 Thus, by allowing an implied 
appointment of an agent by non-resident drivers, the Court had a 
manner in which it could obtain jurisdiction over the non-resident 
driver, and despite not having attachable property it could enforce a 
judgment as Pennoyer would allow. 
While Hess helps illustrate the difficulties courts faced in 
applying Pennoyer to modern America, it did not address the difficulties 
associated with determining jurisdiction over corporations.33 Courts 
formulated different rules to define when a state could and could not 
claim jurisdiction over a corporation doing business within its 
boundaries.34 The Supreme Court tried to settle the split in 1945 and 
                                                 
in the territory unnecessary for service); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s 
“Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 729 (2012) (noting the court shifted the analysis from whether 
Massachusetts lacked authority to serve the defendant, rendering any judgment as 
contrary to the Due Process Clause, to whether enactment of the statute violated the 
Due Process Clause). 
26   90 Gen. Laws Mass. as amended by Stat. 1923, c. 431, § 2. 
27   See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356-57. 
28   Id. at 356-57. 
29   See id. at 355 (citing e.g. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1918); Goldey 
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1894); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714). 
30   See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356. 
31   See id. at 356 (quoting Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916)). 
32   Hess, 274 U.S. at 357. 
33   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1007. 
34   Id. 
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provide a universal standard in determining jurisdiction over 
corporations.35 
2.  International Shoe. — In International Shoe Company v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies substantive criteria for deciding 
personal jurisdiction issues.36 Criticism has been levied against the 
Court, however, for its vagueness in defining what general jurisdiction 
entails.37 
International Shoe Company was a St. Louis-based company, 
which sent sample shoes to approximately eleven agents located in the 
state of Washington et alibi.38 Washington wanted to collect 
employment taxes, which were due from International Shoe.39 Notice 
was served to International Shoe’s agent in Washington and by 
certified mail to its home office.40 International Shoe argued that its 
activities in Washington were not “sufficient to manifest its 
‘presence,’” and thus, the state of Washington violated its due process 
rights in subjecting it to suit.41 
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Stone analyzed Pennoyer-
era decisions42 and determined that the satisfaction of due process in 
personal jurisdiction “depend[s] rather upon the quality and nature of 
the activity . . . .”43 Based on this principle, Chief Justice Stone 
announced what is known as the “minimum contacts” doctrine.44 As 
stated by Chief Justice Stone, “due process requires only that in order 
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
                                                 
35   See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
36   Perdue, supra note 25, at 733. 
37   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (Black, J., concurring); Hoffheimer, supra 
note 13; Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed 
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998); Perdue, supra note 25 at 
734-35. 
38   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313. 
39   Id. at 312-13. The commissions received by the salespersons were in 
excess of $31,000. 
40   Id. 
41   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315. 
42   Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008. 
43   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
44   Id. at 316. 
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within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts 
with it. . . .”45 Chief Justice Stone continued to rule that, “the 
maintenance of the suit [can]not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”46 
Chief Justice Stone’s “minimum contacts” doctrine provides 
no real guidance on how courts are to determine a corporation’s 
presence within a certain jurisdiction.47 To better substantiate its new 
standard, the Court returned to the Pennoyer era and sorted cases into 
one of four categories.48 The categories assist in determining whether 
a corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state to 
allow jurisdiction.49 Chief Justice Stone asserts that those cases 
involving continuous and systematic activities related to the claim at 
bar, and cases involving isolated incidents not related to the claim at 
bar are obvious cases in which jurisdiction could be conferred and not 
conferred, respectively.50 Conversely, those cases involving continuous 
activities not related to the claims at bar or single occasional acts by a 
corporate agent make the jurisdictional determination more difficult.51 
The “minimum contacts” doctrine has served as an expansion 
of the basic principles set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff and its progeny.52 The 
new test serves as a policy-based and flexible analytical approach, 
                                                 
45   Id.; but see, id. at 322 (Black, J., concurring) (the Court went too far by 
announcing its new due process rule). 
46   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940); see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91(1917)). 
47   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561 (“the court’s new ‘minimum 
contacts’ requirement added little more than the appropriate label when a court 
decided that a case satisfied constitutional requirements.”); See also Douglas D. 
McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 761 (2003) 
(criticizing the minimum contacts test). 
48   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 558-61 (describing the four categories 
as cases involving: (1) a corporation’s continuous and systematic contacts within a 
state; (2) the casual presence of a corporate agent, or an isolated incident unrelated 
to the claims at bar; (3) continuous and systematic contacts distinct from the causes 
of action; and (4) single occasional acts by an agent in the state). 
49   See id. 
50   Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
51   Id. at 318. 
52   Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561. 
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taking into consideration concerns like fairness, to both states and 
corporations.53 
3.  Onward Ho!: Development of the “Minimum Contacts” Doctrine. — 
Since the ruling of the “minimum contacts” doctrine in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court has 
proceeded to split personal jurisdiction into two categories. These 
categories are 1) specific, “case-linked” jurisdiction, and 2) general 
jurisdiction.54 
The specific, case-linked category of cases has been bifurcated 
to examine, first, the minimum contacts of a corporation within the 
forum, and second, the fairness of hailing the corporation into such 
forum.55 Furthermore, the Court has continued to apply this analysis 
to the realm of products liability cases, adopting a “stream of 
commerce” doctrine.56 
The second category, general jurisdiction, involves the two 
categories of cases proffered in International Shoe in which personal 
jurisdiction determinations are obvious.57 The following subsections 
will discuss each of the categories with more detail.58 
a.  Stream of commerce and fairness. – In World Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Supreme Court set forth a “stream 
                                                 
53   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 561; 
McFarland, supra note 47, at 761; McMunigal, supra note 37, at 195-96. 
54   Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! 
Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability 
Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 116 (2012). 
55   Id. at 117. 
56   See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
57   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (cases involving continuous and systematic 
activities related to the claim at bar are cases in which jurisdiction could obviously be 
conferred, while cases of isolated incidents not related to the claim at bar are 
situations in which jurisdiction could obviously not be conferred); see also Simpson-
Wood, supra note 54, at 118 (describing these cases as those in which “a foreign 
defendant’s contacts with the forum do not relate to the cause of action, but are “so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum state”) 
(citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)). 
58   The “minimum contacts” portion of category one will not be discussed, 
as it was expounded upon in the previous section. 
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of commerce” standard by determining whether a corporation 
“purposefully availed” itself to the forum.59 The Court based this 
doctrine on fairness.60 In doing so, the Court listed five factors to be 
considered in determining whether it is fair to hail a defendant into 
court in a particular forum: (1) the defendant must have a relationship 
with the forum which would make it “reasonable . . . to require the 
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there,” (2) 
the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, (3) “the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” (4) the 
interest of the entire interstate judicial system in the most efficient 
resolution of controversies, and (5) the interest of States in “furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”61 
World Wide Volkswagen involved New York residents who were 
injured when their car, purchased in New York, exploded in 
Oklahoma.62 The plaintiffs brought suit against the vehicle’s regional 
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, and its retail dealer, Seaway, inter 
alia.63 Seaway only sold cars in Massena, New York, and World-Wide’s 
market only extended to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.64 
In determining the defendants could not be brought into court 
in Oklahoma, the Court founded its reasoning in fairness.65 It did so 
through a two-prong approach based in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.66 
                                                 
59   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98; See also Gray v. American 
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 441 (1961) (that stream of 
commerce was originally espoused in this case). 
60   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
61   Id. 
62   Id. at 288. 
63   See id. (The plaintiffs argued that it was foreseeable that cars sold by 
World-Wide and Seaway would travel to Oklahoma. From this the plaintiffs asserted 
World-Wide and Seaway had minimum contacts necessary to attain personal 
jurisdiction). 
64   See id. at 298. 
65   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294. 
66   See id. at 292, 297-99; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11. 
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Professor Carol Andrews67 explains that the first prong ensures 
protection to foreign defendants by limiting the ability of states to 
exceed their jurisdiction as “coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”68 
This is evident when Justice White writes, “[we] stress[] that the Due 
Process clause ensures not only fairness, but also the ‘orderly 
administration of the laws.’”69 
The second prong protects the defendant from litigating in an 
inconvenient forum by examining facts within the five factors listed by 
the court.70 In applying the second prong, Justice White notes that 
fairness under the Due Process Clause does not turn on a defendant’s 
ability to foresee that its product may end up in a specific forum.71 
Rather, a defendant’s “conduct and connection with the forum state” 
must be “such that . . . [through its] purposeful[] avail[ment] . . . it has 
clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the 
risk of burdensome litigation.”72 
Professor Wendy Perdue73 has argued that the World Wide 
Volkswagen Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause shifted 
the Clause away from a procedural jurisdiction safeguard to a 
substantive “defendant-focused approach.”74 This criticism certainly 
carries some merit, as Justice White writes that even when fairness is 
not lacking, the Due Process Clause may “divest the State of its power 
to render a valid judgment.”75 Regardless of Professor Perdue’s, and 
other scholars’, critical view of the Court’s reasoning in World Wide 
Volkswagen, gaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant 
                                                 
67   Douglas Arant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of 
Law. 
68   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 
U.S. at 292). 
69   World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 293-94 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 
at 319). 
70   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1010-11. 
71   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 297. 
72   Id. 
73 Dean, University of Richmond School of Law. 
74   See Perdue, supra note 25, at 733-34 (commenting that the Court 
incorrectly restates the holding from Pennoyer v. Neff allowing it to shift the Due 
Process Clause from a mechanism for a procedural challenge of jurisdiction to a 
substantive standard by which to assess a jurisdictional challenge). 
75   World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S. at 294. 
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requires a fairness examination under the Due Process Clause.76 
However, prior to the fairness examination, the defendant had to 
purposefully avail himself to that jurisdiction by introducing his 
product into that jurisdiction’s stream of commerce; the mere 
possibility of the product entering the foreign jurisdiction was not 
enough.77 
Later cases have followed the fairness standard established in 
World-Wide Volkswagen.78 In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., the plaintiff 
sought jurisdiction in New Hampshire to bring suit against Hustler 
Magazine.79 In holding that New Hampshire had jurisdiction to hear 
the plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court reasoned Hustler Magazine 
had sufficient minimum contacts in New Hampshire80 such that it was 
fair to compel the magazine to face suit in New Hampshire.81 Beyond 
the extent of Hustler’s sales in New Hampshire, the Court based its 
reasoning of fairness on the second World Wide Volkswagen factor, 
stating that New Hampshire had a strong interest in holding Hustler 
accountable for libel committed within its jurisdiction.82 This interest 
is created because Hustler’s libel of Keeton harms both Keeton and 
New Hampshire’s own citizens who read Hustler’s publication.83 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz84 made a very subtle but important 
change to the original two-prong standard established in World-Wide 
                                                 
76   See id. at 294-95. 
77   See id. at 297-98. 
78   See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); see also Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
79   Plaintiff Keeton assisted in the production of Hustler Magazine. Her 
name appears in several places on the magazines. Hustler sold approximately 10,000-
15,000 copies of Hustler Magazine in New Hampshire. Plaintiff sued Hustler, 
claiming Hustler libeled her in five separate issues of its magazine. Keeton brought 
suit in New Hampshire, claiming New Hampshire could exert personal jurisdiction 
over Hustler. Neither plaintiff nor defendant was a resident of New Hampshire. 
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772. 
80   See id. (Hustler sold approximately 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its 
magazines each month in New Hampshire.). 
81   Id. at 781. 
82   See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775-76. 
83   See id. 
84   Defendants Rudzewicz and MacShara entered into a franchising 
agreement with Burger King Corp. Burger King was headquartered in Miami, 
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Volkswagen.85 Above the surface, the Court’s holding was quite simple 
and aligned with its predecessors.86 According to the Court, the 
contract between Rudzewicz and Burger King created a “continuing 
obligation” between himself and Burger King, a resident of Florida, 
thereby availing himself of the “privilege of conducting business 
there . . . [and being] shielded by [Florida’s] laws.”87 Thus, it was 
foreseeable that he may be brought into court in Florida.88 
Below the surface, however, Justice Brennan attempted to shift 
the Court away from a strong defendant-centered minimum contacts 
test by redefining the burden of proof required to defeat personal 
jurisdiction.89 Brennan made clear that, once the plaintiff has proven 
the existence of a contact, the defendant has what Professor Richard 
Freer90 calls a “strikingly onerous burden.”91 That burden requires the 
defendant to present a “compelling case” showing jurisdiction to be 
“so gravely difficult and inconvenient [he] . . . is at a severe 
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”92 As a result of the 
increased burden on the defendant, much of the Court’s discussion in 
subsequent cases has focused on the contacts of a defendant with a 
forum more than the fairness of hailing a defendant into a particular 
forum.93 
                                                 
Florida, but had a regional office in Michigan. The franchising agreement required 
payments over a twenty-year period, which would total more than one million 
dollars. Defendants fell behind on payments to Burger King and subsequently 
entered into negotiations with Burger King’s Michigan and Florida offices to settle 
payment issues. After negotiations broke down, Burger King filed suit in Florida. 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464-68. 
85   See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 570-72 (2012). 
86   See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462 (a Michigan defendant had contracted 
with a Florida corporation, which, according to the court, fairly availed him to 
Florida’s jurisdiction since the contract had an abundance of requirements, all having 
a connection with Florida). 
87   Id. at 476. 
88   Id. at 474. 
89   See Freer, supra note 85, at 571-72. 
90 Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
91   Id. at 572. 
92   Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata-Off Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)). 
93   See Freer, supra note 85, at 574-76, 581, 589. 
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Interestingly, despite the increased burden of proof on the 
defendant, two years later, in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal.,94 the Court used the fairness standard to find that Asahi could not 
be brought into court in California.95 Justice O’Connor and three other 
justices determined that, in addition to jurisdiction being unfair, 
California lacked sufficient contacts with Asahi.96 The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the 
forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come 
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum 
State.”97 Simple awareness by a defendant that its product will be swept 
into a particular forum through a stream of commerce does not 
amount to purposefully directing its product toward that state by 
placing the product within such stream.98 
Post-Asahi, to gain specific personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant, a forum must survive a two-prong approach.99 First, it must 
prove minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum.100 In 
the case of a corporation the Court will look to whether or not the 
defendant purposefully placed its product in the stream of 
commerce.101 Second, it must prove that it is fair to hail the defendant 
into the forum.102 With the post-Burger King increased burden of proof 
upon the defendant to rebut jurisdiction by arguing the forum is unfair, 
                                                 
94   Plaintiff was a California citizen whose wife died in a motorcycle crash 
after one of the tires blew out. Plaintiff brought suit against Cheng Shin Rubber 
Industrial Co., Ltd. Cheng Shin sought indemnification from Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
Cheng Shin bought parts from Asahi and incorporated those parts in tires it sold. 
Cheng Shin did approximately twenty percent of its business in the United States. 
Asahi has no offices, property, or agents in California. Its offices were located in 
Japan. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102. 
95   See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 576 (Asahi is 
the only case in which fairness was used to reject jurisdiction). 
96   Freer, supra note 85, at 574-75. 
97   Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
98   Id. 
99   See Freer, supra note 85, at 552-53; see also Andrews, supra note 20, at 
1010-11. 
100   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.  
101   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. 
102   See id. 
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defendants’ best chance of overcoming jurisdiction is proving a lack of 
contacts, and the case law has reflected this shift towards contacts.103 
b.  Goodyear v. Brown: A look at general jurisdiction. – As 
discussed earlier, Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe classified 
two categories of cases: those in which the alleged acts are tied directly 
to the contacts of the defendant and those in which the alleged acts are 
not tied to the contacts of the defendant.104 Professor Carol Andrews 
has termed cases: in which the alleged acts are tied directly to the 
defendant’s “continuous and systematic” contacts as “easy yes” cases; 
in which the defendant had “isolated” contacts with the forum or the 
alleged acts are not tied to those contacts as “easy no” cases; in which 
the defendant’s contacts were extensive but the alleged acts were 
unrelated or instances where the defendant’s contacts were “isolated” 
but the alleged act was tied to those contacts as “maybe” cases.105 
Andrews further notes that the “easy yes” cases and the 
“maybe” cases involving isolated but related contacts have been 
termed by the court as specific jurisdiction.106 Those cases were 
discussed above. This subsection seeks to inform the reader as to the 
Court’s position on the “easy no” and continuous but unrelated 
contacts cases, now termed general personal jurisdiction.107 
The most recent case involving general personal jurisdiction is 
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations v. Brown.108 The defendant contested 
jurisdiction in North Carolina as improper.109 The defendants had no 
connections to North Carolina outside of their parent company and a 
small fraction of tires they sold in North Carolina, typically custom 
ordered for specific vehicles.110 According to the Court, the “paradigm 
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction . . . for a corporation 
                                                 
103   See Freer, supra note 85, at 589. 
104   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13. 
105   See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1008-09. 
106   Id. at 1009. 
107   See id. at 1009-10. 
108   Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2848 (subsidiaries of Goodyear U.S.A. were 
sued by the parents of children killed when a bus, using tires manufactured by the 
subsidiaries, rolled over near Paris, France). 
109   Id. at 2852. 
110   Id. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
536 
[is] . . . one in which [it] is fairly regarded as at home.”111 Hoffheimer 
states that the Court understands “at home” as relating to the 
defendant’s state of incorporation, its principal place of business, and 
potentially anywhere in which it has “substantial, continuous, and 
systematic activity.”112 Using the paradigmatic forum analysis, the 
Court determined that the defendant subsidiaries’ connections to 
North Carolina “fall far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general 
business contacts’ necessary” for jurisdiction over them on claims 
“unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”113 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court contrasted the prior case 
of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.114 Perkins involved a Philippine 
mining company which ceased its operations to Ohio during World 
War II.115 The company’s president maintained an office in Ohio and 
supervised its mining activities from the Ohio office.116 The Court in 
Perkins found that, because Ohio was the principal place of business, 
even temporarily, general jurisdiction was proper in Ohio.117 
The Court also compared another prior case, Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,118 in which general jurisdiction in 
Texas was found improper when a Colombian helicopter operation 
company was sued in a wrongful death suit.119 The defendant’s only 
ties to Texas were: acceptance of checks drawn on a Houston bank 
account; helicopters, equipment, and training services purchased from 
a Texas corporation; and personnel training in Texas.120 The Helicopteros 
Court concluded “‘mere purchases [made in the forum State], even if 
occurring at regular intervals, are not enough [for general] jurisdiction 
                                                 
111   Id. at 2853-54. 
112   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551. 
113   Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). 
114   See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
115   Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.  
116   Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. 
117   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; see also Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. 
118   Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408. 
119   See id. at 415-16. 
120   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416). 
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over a non-resident corporation” when the purchase transactions are 
not related to the cause of action.121 
The Goodyear Court leaned towards the reasoning of 
Helicopteros, indicating that the only way in which systematic activity 
within a forum will allow for general jurisdiction is if such activity takes 
place at extremely high volumes.122 
After Goodyear, the state of general jurisdiction is not fully 
known.123 It appears that the Court stripped general jurisdiction down 
to the point that it is only applicable in cases in which the corporation 
is, literally, “at home” in the forum.124 
Thus, to obtain jurisdiction over an ex juris defendant in the 
United States, a forum must be able to obtain either specific 
jurisdiction, which is focused on minimum contacts and fairness, or 
general jurisdiction, which is focused on whether the defendant is “at 
home.” The Goodyear court informed us that, since International Shoe, 
the Supreme Court has focused primarily on cases involving specific 
personal jurisdiction.125 Nevertheless, general jurisdiction still exists as 
an option for plaintiffs who cannot obtain specific jurisdiction over a 
defendant. 
Having surveyed the development of American jurisprudence 
on personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants, we must proceed to 
survey such jurisprudence in Canada. 
B.         Personal Jurisdiction Over Ex Juris Defendants in Canada 
Modern day personal jurisdiction in Canada is rooted in the 
English House of Lords, which developed a “real and substantial 
                                                 
121   See id. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418). 
122   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 592; but see Freer, supra note 85, at 
587-88 (arguing that even high levels of sales activity is unlikely to justify general 
personal jurisdiction). 
123   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551. 
124   See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 551; see also Freer, supra note 85, at 
585. 
125   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854. 
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connection” test.126 After Indyka, the real and substantial connection 
test was employed three more times before, in 1990, becoming 
“enshrined as a central jurisdictional principle” in Morguard Investments 
Ltd. v. De Savoye.127 
In 1993, Hunt v. T&N PLC. made clear that the principles 
enunciated in Morguard were constitutionally founded.128 Over the next 
nineteen years, the Supreme Court of Canada defined what a “real and 
substantial” connection was, culminating its efforts in its 2012 decision 
of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda.129 This section will summarily track 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s development of the real and 
substantial connection test from its roots in Indyka to its current state 
following Van Breda. 
1.  Early Development of the “Real and Substantial Connection” 
Doctrine. — The real and substantial connection doctrine originated in 
the English case Indyka v. Indyka.130 Prior to Indyka, an English woman’s 
ability to obtain a divorce was dependent upon a set of particular 
rules.131 With the introduction of the real and substantial connection 
test, the previous rules were replaced by a general principle revolving 
around the strength of a person’s connection with a particular 
forum.132 The Supreme Court of Canada expanded the use of the real 
and substantial connection test, in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 
to torts.133 
In Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada held it reasonable to 
find a real and substantial connection with a forum, thereby allowing 
that forum to have jurisdiction, if a defendant could reasonably foresee 
that its product would cause injury and be used and consumed in the 
                                                 
126   Joost Blom, Q.C. & Elizabeth Edinger, Conflicts of Law: The Chimera of 
the Real and Substantial Connection Test, 38 U.B.C L. REV. 373, 374-76 (2005)(stating that 
the English case Indyka v. Indyka established a more uniform system of divorce). 
127   Id. at 377-78. 
128   Id. at 378, 385. 
129   See generally, Blom, supra note 126; Peter J. Pliszka, My Place or Yours? 
SCC Sets New and Improved Test for Jurisdiction in Canada, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 273 (2013). 
130   See Blom, supra note 126, at 375. 
131   Id. at 375-76. 
132   Id. at 376. 
133   See Moran v. Pyle National (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, 408-09; see 
also Blom, supra note 126, at 377. 
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foreign jurisdiction.134 The Court’s decision resembled its American 
counterpart’s stream of commerce inquiry.135 Like the Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen, the Moran Court would require a strong enough 
relationship between the defendant and the forum to make it fair to 
require the defendant to litigate in the foreign forum.136 
The Moran holding further compares with the American tort 
case of Calder v. Jones.137 The United States Supreme Court held in Calder 
that California could assert jurisdiction over two Florida journalists, 
with essentially no contacts to California, because they wrote a libelous 
story about a California citizen with the knowledge and expectation 
that it would be widely circulated in California.138 In both cases, the 
American and Canadian Supreme Courts showed they were willing to 
extend a stream of commerce-like analysis to tort cases. 
Almost two decades after Moran, the Supreme Court of Canada 
once again relied on the real and substantial connection test.139 In 
Morguard v. De Savoye, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue 
of whether a judgment in one province could be recognized by 
another.140 In determining that the Alberta judgment should be 
recognized in British Columbia, La Forest J. focused on balancing 
order and fairness.141 Order, La Forest J. opined, dictates that a foreign 
provinces’ judgment should be recognized across Canada for reasons 
                                                 
134   Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. (Can.) at 409. 
135   See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); 
see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
136   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Moran, [1975] 1 S.C.R. at 
(Can.) 409. 
137   Calder, 465 U.S. 783. 
138   Id. at 789-90. 
139   Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 1077; Blom, 
supra note 23, at 378; Monestier, supra note 6, at 180-81. 
140   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1082. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
subsequently explained that, though Morguard explained the real and substantial 
connection test “from the perspective of recognition and enforcement, La Forest J. 
made it clear that precisely the same real and substantial connection test applies to 
the assumption of jurisdiction against an out-of-province defendant.” Muscutt v. 
Courcelles, [2002] CanLII 44957, para. 38 (ON CA). 
141   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 
381. 
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of comity.142 La Forest J. compared this idea to the United States’ full 
faith and credit clause.143 
Fairness, La Forest J. determined, was more important than 
order.144 While order provided ample reasoning to support judgment 
recognition across Canada, fairness was a necessity.145 La Forest J. 
described fairness as the relationship between the jurisdiction’s 
contacts and the defendant or subject matter of the suit.146 
Accordingly, the Morguard court acknowledges three grounds upon 
which a court can claim jurisdiction over a defendant: 1) the defendant 
is served in personam; 2) the defendant consents to jurisdiction through 
agreement or attornment;147 and 3) there is a real and substantial 
connection between the defendant or cause of action and the forum.148 
Though Morguard focused on the recognition of interprovincial 
judgments, La Forest J. provides undertones throughout his opinion 
which seem to relate the expressed principles to the realm of private 
international law.149 
                                                 
142   See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) at 1096-97. 
143   See id. at 1100, 1102. 
144   See id. at 1102-03; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 381 (arguing the 
Morguard decision sacrificed order for fairness). 
145   See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103. 
146   Id. 
147   “Attornment occurs when a defendant, by his or her conduct consents 
or submits to a jurisdiction . . . without reserving its right to challenge the claimant’s 
chosen jurisdiction at a later time.” Melissa Kehrer & John A. Olah, Trips, Traps and 
Jurisdiction Part 2, CLAIMS CAN. (Feb. 2008), 
http://www.claimscanada.ca/issues/article.aspx?aid= 1000219849&er=NA; see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (9th ed. 2009). 
148   Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103-04. For a hypothetical example of all 
three grounds, see also Stephen C. Nadler, Navigating the Litigation Landscape in Canada: 
Securing Evidence and Enforcing Judgments, BUS. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 42; Cf. 
Monestier, supra note 6, at n. 2 (noting Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, places the most 
importance on whether there is a real and substantial connection, while other indicia 
(presence and consent) bolster the real and substantial connection). 
149   See Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1095 (“Modern states, however, cannot 
live in splendid isolation and do give effect to judgments given in other countries in 
certain circumstances”); id. at 1097 (“what must underlie a modern system of private 
international law are principles of order and fairness, principles that ensure security 
of transactions with justice”); id. at 1098 (noting that the United States and European 
countries have created more generous rules for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments). 
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Shortly after Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunt 
v. T & N plc.,150 reiterated the importance of order and fairness but 
chose not to further define the scope and application of the real and 
substantial connection test.151 La Forest J. wrote that the real and 
substantial connection test was a flexible test which simply “captured 
the idea that there must be some limits on claims to jurisdiction.”152 
The Hunt opinion details some prior applications of the real and 
substantial connection test, concluding that “no test can perhaps ever 
be rigidly applied . . . [and] the assumption of . . . jurisdiction must 
ultimately be guided by the requirements of order and fairness, not a 
mechanical counting of contacts or connections.”153 
The plaintiff in Hunt, a resident of British Columbia, alleged he 
was injured due to the tortious behavior of the defendants domiciled 
in Quebec.154 The plaintiff brought action in British Columbia and 
sought production of various documents.155 The defendants refused to 
produce the documents on the ground that they were not required to 
do so because they were protected by the Quebec Business Concerns 
Records Act.156 On the basis of Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the Quebec Act was not applicable to the proceedings in 
British Columbia.157 
The Hunt decision elevated the Morguard principles to 
constitutional status, indicating that they cannot be overridden by 
provincial courts.158 The Court determined that the idea of Canadian 
                                                 
150   Hunt v. T & N plc., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289. 
151   Blom, supra note 126, at 385. 
152   Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 325. 
153   Id. at 326; cf. Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (focusing on the fairness of California 
exercising jurisdiction despite a lack of contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
293-94 (stressing that the Due Process Clause ensures fairness and the orderly 
administration of the laws); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958) (describing 
the evolution of American in personam jurisdiction from the rigid Pennoyer v. Neff to 
the more flexible Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington). 
154   Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 297. 
155   Id. at 298. 
156   Id. at 298; see generally Robert Wisner, Uniformity, Diversity, and Provincial 
Extraterritorality: Hunt v. T & N plc., 40 MCGILL L.J. 759, 762 (1995) (explaining the 
Quebec Business Concerns Records Act is a blocking statute, prohibiting the removal of 
business documents from the province for the purpose of litigation). 
157   See Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 331-32. 
158   See id. at 324; see also Blom, supra note 126, at 385. 
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provinces giving full faith and credit to the judgments of other 
provinces was a “constitutional imperative[],” and while provinces may 
enact legislation regarding the recognition of judgments of other 
provinces, Morguard established a minimum threshold for order and 
fairness which the provinces must respect.159 
The international undertones of Morguard and its emphasis on 
the importance of order and fairness, subsequently echoed in Hunt, 
were expressed together in McNichol Estate v. Woldnik.160 McNichol Estate 
involved a Florida chiropractor, Dr. Puentes, being sued in Ontario 
following the death of Louis McNichol, an Ontario resident who died 
in Florida.161 Dr. Puentes was the only non-resident of Ontario named 
in the lawsuit.162 Dr. Puentes argued to have the real and substantial 
connection test applied to him separately from the other defendants. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal refused to do so.163 
Rationalizing why it chose not to apply the real and substantial 
test to Dr. Puentes separately, the Court argued to do so “would be a 
step backwards . . . away from the recognition of the increasingly 
complex and interdependent nature of the modern world community 
which lies at the heart of [Morguard’s and Hunt’s] reasoning.”164 Further, 
the Court wrote, “it would mute the influence of the underlying 
requirements of order and fairness.”165 The decision of the Court 
emphasizes that the order and fairness dictated by the real and 
substantial connection test extends beyond inter-provincial disputes to 
foreign disputes. 
2.  What is a real and substantial connection?: The modern real and 
substantial connection doctrine.- While the Canadian Supreme Court chose 
not to expand upon the real and substantial connection test in Hunt, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal did do so in Muscutt v. Courcelles.166 The 
                                                 
159   Hunt [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 324. 
160   McNichol v. Woldnik, [2001] CanLII 5679 (ON CA). 
161   Id. at para. 1. 
162   Id. 
163   Id. at para. 12-15. 
164   McNichol, 2001 CanLII at para. 12. 
165   Id. 
166   See Muscutt,(2002) CanLII. 44957. The Canadian Court system is 
similar to that of the United States. Provincial trial courts appeal to provincial courts 
of appeal, which appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, just as American 
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Ontario court listed eight factors to consider when determining 
whether a forum can ascertain jurisdiction over a foreign defendant: 
the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim; the 
connection between the forum and the defendant; unfairness to the 
defendant in assuming jurisdiction; unfairness to the plaintiff in not 
assuming jurisdiction; the involvement of other parties to the suit; the 
court’s willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-provincial 
judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; whether the case 
is inter-provincial or international in nature; and comity and the 
standards of jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement prevailing 
elsewhere.167 
Legal Scholar Tonya Monestier notes that the Supreme Court 
of Canada never explicitly endorsed the Muscutt factors.168 The Ontario 
Court of Appeal, following the rationale of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s opinion in Morguard, believed that fairness to both parties was 
important, and that the eight factors provided for fairness as well as 
flexibility, as Morguard discussed.169 This led to the biggest criticism of 
the Muscutt factors: only the first two factors actually dealt with a 
connection of any sort between the forum and the claim or 
defendant.170 Despite this criticism from scholars, the Muscutt factors 
were considered influential in other provinces.171 
The eight factors were challenged in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van 
Breda.172 The Canadian Supreme Court found it necessary to more 
clearly articulate factors defining what a real and substantial connection 
                                                 
appellate courts can act in the absence of action by the Supreme Court, so can 
provincial appellate courts in Canada.  
167   Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 (Can.) at para. 75-104. 
168   Monestier, supra note 6, at 183. 
169   See Muscutt, (2002) CanLII 44957 at para. 72, 86-88; see also Monestier, 
supra note 6, at 193-94. 
170   See Monestier, supra note 6, at 184 (“[The final six factors] are not 
strictly concerned with the connection of the forum to the parties and the cause of 
action.”) (quoting Bastarache J., in Castillo v. Castillo, 2005 SCC 83, para. 45)); Stephen 
G.A. Pitel, Reformulating a Real and Substantial Connection, 60 U.N.B.L.J. 177, 182 (2010); 
see also Blom, supra note 123, at 394 (“Only the first two of the eight factors are strictly 
factual in nature”). 
171   Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, (Can.) para. 48-51 
available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/8004/index.do. 
172   See Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.). 
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is, in line with current trends in Canadian jurisprudence.173 The Van 
Breda Court acknowledged that this was the direction the Ontario 
Court of Appeal was heading in, but that the list of connecting factors 
should not include factors based on fairness, efficiency, and comity.174 
As a result, the Canadian Supreme Court replaced the list of 
eight factors in Muscutt with four factors of its own: the defendant was 
domiciled in the province; the defendant carries on business in the 
province175; the tort was committed in the province; and a contract 
connected with the dispute was created in the province.176 In creating 
these four connecting factors, the Court rejected the fairness and injury 
factors from Muscutt on the grounds that they are too attenuated and 
should not be separated from the factual factors announced in Van 
Breda.177 
Of particular interest to this comment is the Van Breda court’s 
removal of the Muscutt factor considering whether an action is inter-
provincial or international in nature. The Court determined that issues 
relating to foreign law may remain helpful in determining 
jurisdiction.178 However, it cautioned that focusing on juridical 
disadvantages in jurisdictional analysis is not “consonant with the 
principle of comity which should govern legal relationships between 
modern democratic states.”179 
The four connecting factors create a rebuttable presumption 
for the defendant, but do not create a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of the plaintiff.180 Thus, the Van Breda Court moved from what it saw 
as an over-inclusive, unpredictable list of factors, to a more fact-based, 
                                                 
173   See id., 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 75-79 (indicating that the CJPTA 
and other sources of jurisprudence need to be aligned with a set of rebuttable 
presumptive factors). 
174   Id. ¶¶ 74, 79, 82, 84. 
175   See id. ¶ 87 (recognizing that though carrying on business in the 
province may be a presumptive factor in favor of jurisdiction, there are some 
business activities such as advertising and web site access in the jurisdiction which 
cannot give rise to a presumption of jurisdiction). 
176   Id. ¶ 90(d). 
177   Id. ¶¶ 84-89. 
178   Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 63. 
179   Id. 
180   See id. ¶¶ 92-93; see also Pliszka, supra note 129, at 277. 
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clear set of factors for determining whether a real and substantial 
connection exists.181 As an example of this rebuttable presumption, the 
Court posed the hypothetical situation in which the factor at issue is 
that a defendant carries on business in the forum.182 According to the 
court, a possible rebuttal to this presumption is that the subject matter 
of the suit is unrelated to the defendant’s business activities in the 
forum, similar to one of the categories of cases identified in International 
Shoe.183 
Van Breda involved a couple who contracted in Ontario with 
Club Resorts Ltd. for sport services at a club in Cuba, managed by 
Club Resorts.184 Shortly after the trip began, Ms. Van Breda was 
catastrophically injured on the beach when a metal contraption 
collapsed on her.185 Upon return from Cuba, Ms. Van Breda and Mr. 
Berg moved to Calgary and British Columbia, but never returned to 
Ontario.186 
Relying on the four presumptive factors created by the 
Canadian Supreme Court, the Court held that the Ontario court could 
exercise jurisdiction.187 The Court reasoned that because the contract 
for services was created in Ontario, the Ontario court properly claimed 
jurisdiction.188 According to the court the injury resulted from the 
obligations created by the contractual relationship which began in 
Ontario.189 
                                                 
181   See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 4. 
182   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 96. 
183   Id.; cf. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (continuous and systematic contacts 
may not be enough to support jurisdiction). 
184   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17, (Can.) at para. 2-3 (The contract created an 
obligation for Mr. Berg to teach two hours of tennis per day at the resort in return 
for room and board at the resort for himself and Ms. Van Breda).  
185   Id. ¶ 4. 
186   Id. 
187   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 118. 
188   Id. ¶ 117. The court determined that Club Resorts’ advertising in 
Ontario was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction because advertising is often 
international or global, and allowing advertising to confer jurisdiction would subject 
large commercial organizations to jurisdiction almost anywhere in the world, id. ¶ 
114. 
189   Id. ¶ 117. 
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Despite the shift in Van Breda to a more delineated set of 
factors, Monestier believes that the court too quickly discounted 
“fairness” to achieve “order.”190 While Monestier acknowledges that 
the Canadian Supreme Court moved in the correct direction with its 
decision in Van Breda, she believes the Court moved to a system which 
is too rigid.191 While this is a fair criticism of the Van Breda decision, 
the general consensus is that the change was a much needed one, as 
Ms. Monestier herself acknowledges.192 The shift by the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Van Breda recognizes the Court’s desire to dissipate 
the attempt to balance “fairness” and “order” in favor of order.193 
II.         ANALYSIS 
As Ms. Monestier points out, the change in tide made by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda ushers in a new understanding 
and era of ex juris jurisdiction in Canada.194 Because of the new 
direction of Canadian ex juris jurisdiction, the Canadian Supreme Court 
has more closely aligned ex juris jurisdiction in Canada with that of the 
United States. As a result, the United States and Canada will be able to 
increase comity with one another resulting in greater cooperation in 
transnational cases. Further, greater cooperation between the two 
nations may further smooth the path for increasing economic ties with 
one another. 
A.         A Fading Border: Closing the Gap Between Canadian 
Jurisdiction and American Jurisdiction 
Professor Black acknowledges that recognition of foreign 
judgments is more likely when the two countries involved have similar 
                                                 
190   Monestier, supra note 6, at 398. 
191   Id. at 412. 
192   Id. at 410-11; see also Pliszka, supra note 129. 
193   See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410; compare Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 
(Can.) at para. 99 (stating that a court is not required to hear only the tort which 
could be connected with the jurisdiction when there are multiple torts at issue), with 
McNichol, (2001) CanLII 5679 at para. 12 (“I do not agree that where an action has 
some claims with an extra-territorial dimension, and others which have none, the 
former must be tested in isolation”). 
194   See Monestier, supra note 6, at 410-11. 
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or identical standards for personal jurisdiction.195 As the new tide in 
Canadian ex juris jurisdiction commences, the Van Breda factors appear 
to align the new Canadian jurisdiction closer to that of the United 
States.196 
1.  Van Breda Factors One and Two: A Defendant-Centric Approach. 
– The first Van Breda factor, whether or not the defendant was 
domiciled in the province, aligns itself well with the minimum contacts 
doctrine provided in International Shoe.197 At the base of Justice Stone’s 
approach in International Shoe is the previous notion of personal 
jurisdiction dating back to Pennoyer, a defendant domiciled in a state is 
subject to personal jurisdiction.198 This a very defendant-centric 
approach. 
The first Van Breda factor has brought personal jurisdiction in 
Canada to a clear, defendant-centric approach as well.199 The court 
stated that a plaintiff’s presence in a jurisdiction is not sufficient to 
create a relationship between the jurisdiction and the subject matter, 
but that a defendant may always be sued in a jurisdiction in which he 
resides.200 This language has the same basic notion as that in Pennoyer, 
the defendant’s domicile is the important consideration.201 Further, by 
looking at Keeton, the United States Supreme Court’s relative disinterest 
in the domicile of the plaintiff is just as clear as that of the Canadian 
Supreme Court.202 
                                                 
195   See Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and Credit Clause?, 
18 SW. J. INT’L L. 595, 606-10 (2011).  
196   See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Keeton, 465 U.S. 770; World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; Hess, 274 U.S. 352; Gray, 22 Ill. 2d 
432; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.). 
197   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 
86. 
198   See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. 
199   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 {Can.) at para. 86; see also Pliszka, supra 
note 129, at 5-6. 
200   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 86. 
201   See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. 
202   Compare Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (stating that a plaintiff’s “lack of 
residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant’s 
contacts”), with Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 at para. 86 (stating that a plaintiff’s 
presence in a jurisdiction “will not create a presumptive relationship between the 
forum and either the subject matter of the litigation or the defendant”). 
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Van Breda’s second factor, whether the defendant carries on 
business within the province, is linked to the idea of purposeful 
availment, originating in Gray v. American Radiator,203 but first used by 
the United States Supreme Court in Worldwide Volkswagen.204 Once 
again this factor, like its American counterpart, is defendant-centric.205 
The Canadian Supreme Court determined that the broad 
announcement of a rule relating to the business activities of a 
defendant in a forum was ill-advised.206 The United States Supreme 
Court came to this same conclusion in World-Wide Volkswagen.207 
Additionally, the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation of 
this factor is similar to general jurisdiction in the United States.208 Part 
of the Canadian Supreme Court’s explanation states one way to satisfy 
this factor is through “maintaining an office [in the jurisdiction].”209 
Such reasoning is precisely what the United States Supreme Court used 
in Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co. to determine the defendant was 
domiciled in Ohio.210 
While the first two Van Breda factors have aligned U.S. and 
Canadian personal jurisdiction as they relate to the domicile and 
business activities of the defendant, the last two factors revolve around 
the subject matter at dispute in a case. 
2.  Van Breda Factors Three and Four: Subject Matter Focus. - Van 
Breda’s third factor, whether the tort was committed in the province, 
finds an American counterpart in both Pawloski and Keeton.211 This 
                                                 
203   See Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 441. 
204   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. 
205   See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6. 
206   See Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87. 
207   See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
208   See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 13, 
at 551. 
209   Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 87. 
210   See Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. 
211   See Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 (considering the desire of the jurisdiction in 
which the harm was incurred to resolve the case); see also Hess, 274 U.S. 352 (involving 
a car accident in a jurisdiction the defendant did not reside in); Van Breda, [2012] 
SCC 17 (Can.) at para. 88. 
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factor and the fourth factor both focus on the subject matter at 
dispute.212 
While the minimum contacts doctrine focuses on the 
defendant’s locale and actions, it also examines the impact of the tort 
action in the jurisdiction.213 Keeton serves as the best example. The 
Keeton court focused attention on the idea that the state in which the 
tort took place has an interest in remedying the harm done within its 
borders.214 
The Van Breda Court appears to be addressing the same 
concern through this factor. It describes Tolofson v. Jensen215 as the 
common law starting point for serious consideration of the situs of a 
tort as a factor to consider in jurisdictional analysis.216 Tolofson 
determined that in some tort cases, the lex loci delicti must apply to help 
preserve order.217 
Van Breda’s fourth factor, whether a contract connected with 
the dispute was made in the province, finds similarities to Burger King.218 
Both cases place upon their respective jurisdictional standards an 
impetus to consider the creation of a contract sufficient for 
recognizing jurisdiction over the parties.219 In doing such both courts 
concerned themselves with addressing the impact of the subject matter 
at dispute in determining jurisdiction. 
                                                 
212   See Pliszka, supra note 129, at 5-6. 
213   See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. 770. 
214   See id. at 776. 
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B.         Recognition of Foreign Judgments 
Since the decision in Morguard, Canada has been recognizing 
and enforcing United States’ judgments with more consistency.220 
Justice LaForest wrote in Morguard, “[m]odern times [require that] the 
flow of wealth, skills, and people across boundaries be facilitated in a 
fair and orderly manner.”221 Thus, while Morguard is limited to intra-
provincial judgment disputes,222 Canadian courts have expanded its 
mandate to include foreign judgments.223 
The Canadian Supreme Court emphasized in Van Breda that 
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments are intertwined.224 As a 
result, the framework used in determining a court’s jurisdiction can 
have an impact on a court’s recognition of judgments and vise versa.225 
Further, in Muscutt, the Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that one 
aspect of comity includes the consideration of jurisdictional standards 
as well as judgment recognition and enforcement in other countries.226 
Considering this, along with Black’s observation that greater 
international judgment recognition occurs when countries have similar 
personal jurisdiction standards, the opportunity for increased comity 
between the United States and Canada is greater after Van Breda. 
The choice by Canadian courts to expand recognition and 
enforcement to foreign judgments has not been applauded by all of 
Canada, its legal scholars, and even its courts and judges.227 However, 
as Canadian attorney Allison Sears notes, “[i]t seems a fair assumption 
however, that the ease with which the Court embraced the extension 
                                                 
220   See Black, supra note 195, at 612; Ivan F. Ivankovich, Enforcing U.S. 
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of Morguard into the international realm was largely due to the similarity 
between the Canadian and American legal systems.”228 
Even more so than Canada, the United States recognizes and 
enforces Canadian judgments. To this effect, a majority of states have 
adopted statutes similar to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments 
Recognition Act.229 This act allows for recognition of foreign court 
judgments which are final, conclusive, and enforceable where 
rendered.230 
One of the three requirements for non-recognition is that the 
foreign court lacks personal jurisdiction.231 As a result, though Canada 
and the United States have much in common with one another and, to 
an extent, already recognize and enforce one another’s judgments, 
bringing the two countries’ standards for personal jurisdiction closer 
together will likely decrease the opportunity for this non-recognition 
requirement to materialize. 
Because both countries currently recognize one another’s 
judgments with very little friction, the impact of aligning the two 
standards for personal jurisdiction will not be all that substantial. 
However, though the impact seems minimal, it is an issue which is 
worthy of discussion.232 Four Canadian provinces do not currently 
apply the Morguard standard to American judgments.233 
Further, there is Canadian legislation limiting recognition in 
certain areas, most notably, antitrust and judgments rendered under 
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.234 
While the LIBERTAD issue is substantially legislative, further 
aligning personal jurisdiction standards may encourage those 
                                                 
228   Sears, supra note 227, at 242. 
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provinces which take issue with enforcing foreign judgments to 
become more cooperative with U.S. courts in recognizing judgments. 
Similarity between the two standards may provide greater assurance 
that the treatment parties in Canada receive is similar to that received 
by parties litigating in the United States.235 
Are there other measures which would be more appropriate? 
Numerous authors have written about the idea of either a bilateral 
treaty or enforcement convention to assist the two countries in their 
recognition of one another’s judgments.236 However, as professor 
Black acknowledges, the chances of the legislatures of either country 
taking the required initiative to enact such a treaty or convention is not 
particularly likely.237 With the floundering likelihood that these 
measures will be taken, bridging the gap between the two countries’ 
personal jurisdiction standards seems to present itself as a more viable 
solution, or at the very least, a holdover until a more definite solution 
can be achieved. 
C.         Van Breda’s Implications for Foreign Class Action Suits 
Moving beyond enforcement of one another’s judgments, the 
new real and substantial framework defined in Van Breda has its 
greatest implications in cases that have yet to be decided. More 
specifically, in the future of transnational class action suits.238 
When it comes to a Canadian court recognizing a class action 
judgment rendered in the United States, one of the major factors, and 
only one concerning this comment, in determining whether to enforce 
the judgment is whether there is a “real and substantial connection in 
favor of the foreign jurisdiction.”239 Canada and the United States 
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differ from one another in certain aspects of class action litigation, 
including how classes are defined240 and issue requirements.241 
As Currie informs us, the presence of a real and substantial 
connection is important.242 This requirement is also expressed in the 
United States in the Uniform Money Judgment Enforcement Act.243 
Thus, the movement towards similar standards of personal jurisdiction 
has the potential to increase the frequency of recognition of United 
States class actions which include Canadian citizens. 
To what extent the new definition of the real and substantial 
connection standard will have on class actions is still unproven. More 
specifically, how many of the members in a class will have to meet the 
standards set forth in Van Breda?244 The direction of Canadian courts 
is likely to lead to a requirement that only one of the class members 
meets one of the presumptive Van Breda factors.245 This determination 
finds support in the Canadian focus on common issues class 
definition.246 
However, this is the point at which a question arises regarding 
whether class actions based in Canada will be enforced in the United 
States since American courts define classes based on amount in 
controversy requirements.247 The history of U.S. recognition of 
Canadian judgments and the importance put on a minimum 
contacts/real and substantial connection under the Uniform Act, along 
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with Justice Winkler’s recognition that “practical differences [between 
U.S. and Canadian classes] are more apparent than real,” leads to the 
belief that the new Van Breda factors are more likely to lead to greater 
cross-border enforcement than detract from it.248 
D.        What’s to Become of Us?: The Implications of Van Breda on 
the U.S.-Canadian Trade Partnership 
Finally, the implications of the Van Breda decision on comity 
and trade between the two nations is of significant importance. Justice 
LaForest noted the importance of movement of people, skills, and 
wealth.249 In 2013 the U.S. exported 277,038.3 million dollars worth of 
goods to Canada while importing 305,384.8 million dollars worth of 
goods from Canada.250 The staggering amount of trade that these two 
countries share illustrates the importance of the economic friendship 
between these nations. While that partnership has been in existence 
for decades and will likely continue for decades to come, what 
underlies those numbers is the sheer amount of interaction that U.S. 
and Canadian persons and companies have with one another. From 
interaction, conflict arises. That conflict must be directed toward the 
courts of either the U.S., Canada, or both. The increased efficiency that 
the Van Breda decision provides may be miniscule or large. Only time 
will tell. However, as Professor Black notes, to shrug off the minor 
differences between the U.S. and Canadian courts regarding personal 
jurisdiction would be a mistake.251 Those differences do not produce 
much wake in the individual case, but in the aggregate the transaction 
costs become much more significant.252 With a partnership as large as 
that of the U.S. and Canada, the alignment of their personal jurisdiction 
standards may have a positive effect on lessening those transaction 
costs and thus trade costs.253 
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CONCLUSION 
The development of personal jurisdiction over ex juris 
defendants has developed in the form of the minimum contacts test in 
the United States, and the real and substantial connection standard in 
Canada. Both tests value the importance of fairness and order. 
The minimum contacts test has evolved into a test which 
focuses on the connection between the defendant and the forum. It 
was not until 2012 that Canada caught up. Prior to the Van Breda 
decision, the real and substantial connection standard focused on the 
plaintiff, defendant, and nature of the claim. Van Breda narrowed that 
focus to the defendant and subject matter of a claim, further aligning 
the U.S. and Canadian personal jurisdiction standards. 
As a result, greater comity between the U.S. and Canada can 
ensue. While as of late there has not been large amounts of friction 
between these two countries, commentators have noted that even a 
small amount of friction is worth addressing, because aggregate 
transaction costs involved in a trade partnership as large as that the 
U.S. and Canada have can be large. 
Any steps toward streamlining transactions, in this case judicial 
cooperation, comity, and judgment recognition, can help in reducing 
those costs. Reduced transaction costs leads to more efficient trade 
and a greater relationship between the U.S. and Canada. 
Realistically, the impact of the Van Breda decision will likely be 
relatively small in respect to the relationship between the U.S. and 
Canada, but as Pink Floyd sang “[it’s] just another brick in the wall.”254 
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